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REAL PROPERTY LAW AND MASS HOUSING NEEDS*
SnnuEY ADELON SIEGELt
America faces unprecedented housing problems. Such are the needs for new
housing, representing a backlog of demand aggravated by the cessation of normal
building during the war and the sharp increase in the number of families, that the
very extent of the need engenders extraordinary problems. Yet, there has been a
continuity of practical experience, in the government's large-scale housing operations
before and during the war, which provides a useful point of reference for the action
now required. There has also been continuity in basic social, economic, and political
structure, and with that, a continuity of the legal accompaniment. The continuity
of that legal base and its adaptation to the changing housing problems of successive
generations constitute the subject of this paper.
"Law is a living thing," in Justice Cardozo's apt phrase. Law is a tool, an in-
strument of the community and the policies by which it is governed. In real prop-
erty law as it has evolveol through centuries of Anglo-American history, one can see
mirrored the progress of the world from a predominantly rural, medieval culture to
a highly urban, industrialized system. In general this evolution has been accom-
plished with respect for the tradition of private property and without radical .affront
to the legal principle of stare decisis.
The shortcomings of the legal tools at hand are among the least of the obstacles
to an adequate housing program today, although it must be acknowledged that in
some matters the legal system has been sluggish in keeping up with the policy
changes at other levels. The history of the refining of those tools, however, contains
many an interesting story, and casts light on those legal problems which remain.
Without suggesting any sharp demarcation in dates, a breakdown of the history
of the readjustment of real property law to developing housing needs into three
stages will be useful for our analysis. The first stage is best characterized by the
laissez faire era, when the primary function of government was to preserve order,
and the courts supported on the whole an individualistic view of questions germane
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to housing. This general attitude persisted up to and through part of the nineteenth
century. The second stage marks the emergence of the "welfare state," when reform
movements, in revolt against the shocking slum conditions of the new urban com-
munities, made their weight felt in restrictive and protective legislation, and local
government began to adopt a positive approach to the problem of housing partic-
ularly for its relation to epidemics and disease. While much of the practice that
characterizes this second period is still an integral part of the structure of housing
law and legislation today, since the depression days of the i93o's a new chapter is
being written, which we shall call the third stage. The welfare state has been em-
boldened. The state enters into partnership with private land owners, with l6cal
governments, with the citizenry, to lend its comprehensive powers and its resources
to a fulfillment of housing needs.
FiRsT STAGE-THE PoLIcE STATE AND LAissEz FAME
The common law of real property has unmistakably rural origins, as it was a
rural England in which it took root some centuries ago.* In that setting each man's
home was his castle; and the right to quiet possession was a principal bounty of the
legal system. To protect this possession, the law evolved a system of planning by
private agreement: a doctrine of covenants was formulated whereby, upon a showing
of "privity of estate" or an interest in the land in question, the courts enforced
against takers with notice "covenants" or agreements which preserved certain values
and uses found to "touch and concern" the land. Property values of the individual
home were protected also by the doctrine of nuisance, which, for example, created
a right to recover damages as a protection against noxious fumes exuded by a neigh-
bor's business establishment-or which might even eliminate such offensive uses
altogether. Furthermore, the pressure of the growing 'middle class against persistent
feudal landholdings was reflected in the principle against restraints on alienation,
and in other prohibitions of the creation of remote interests in land. The short-
comings (from the standpoint of housing thinking today) of the then prevailing
social attitude and legal structure are dramatically revealed in the collection of rev-
enue taxes on windows and chimneys.
Actually, in the earlier centuries the controls exercisable by the state over housing
and town planning could not have been weak. Consider, for example, the deploy-
ment of governmental power for the comprehensive rebuilding of London after the
great fire in the seventeenth century. At the* same time the rights of the private
home owner remained generally rather inviolate. With emancipation from the
shackles of the medieval guild and the growth of a new sophisticated conception of
the role of the state upon the advent of laissez faire thinking and practice, interven-
ing centuries became progressively unused to central control. Thus, through the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, first in England and finally in America, there
were liberal concessions to growing trade and business with no brakes on the mount-
ing slums which resulted from the exploitation of labor in concentrated urban
communities.
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"Hands off" may have been meaningful under the housing conditions of the
relatively stable centuries preceding the industrial revolution; but certainly the cen-
turies that saw the development of urban slums could only mock that inheritance of
a rural land law. The official studies of housing conditions in the industrial centers
by the middle of the nineteenth century tell a sorry tale.
SECOND STAGE-THE POLICE PowER AND THE WELFARE STATE
The emerging trend in the nineteenth century in reaction to revelations of the
sordid conditions of the slums was in the direction of increased local governmental
activity to correct such conditions, particularly for their relation to the public health.
The administrative machinery was coming into being which made such attention to
housing needs possible, as local government was undergoing considerable change
during this century in consequence of this and other social conditions accompanying
the industrial revolution; in response to such novel demands on municipal activity,
new administrative posts gradually replaced justices of the peace.
In their tentative approaches to the urban housing problem, municipal officers
proceeded under common law doctrines, generally but not invariably buttressed by
some loose statutory brief for their authority which was related to the police power.
Thus, at common law any private citizen could lawfully abate a nuisance; and now,
like any private citizen, the municipal officer began to exercise such rights, and the
nuisances were not mere highway obstructions and noxious uses of property, as in
previous centuries, but even homes that might become fire hazards, or that were in
such an advanced state of disrepair and insanitary living as to constitute immediate
threats to safety and health. It was a haphazard process and a risky one. The com-
mon law tradition of collateral attack, whereby the public officer was liable for dam-
ages should the courts find subsequently that what he had abated was not a nuisance
"in fact," persisted;' and no more could be done for abatement than was absolutely
necessary, e.g., demolition would not be judicially upheld when mandatory repair
or closure would suffice.2 These risks naturally have acted as a serious deterrent to
actions by municipal officers, even under color of statute or local ordinance,3 to
demolish hazardous dwellings or even to compel repairs. There may be some func-
tional justification for the action for damages as a protection to property rights from
reckless action by local officers under such a defective administrative plan as has
generally prevailed; although the municipal employee is clearly not in a good posi-
tion economically to bear such risks, and may even be damage-proof.
The foregoing statement of the law governing the compulsory repair and demo-
lition of substandard dwellings is, unhappily, almost as true today as it was fifty
years ago. Legislation is piecemeal and unsatisfactory; of 20 municipal demolition
ordinances studied in 1936, 18 were enacted to reduce fire hazards and only 2 to
'See Health Department v. Rector, etc., Trinity Church, 145 N. Y. 32, 39 N. E. 833 (x895).
'Health Department v. Dassori, 21 App. Div. 348, 47 N. Y. Supp. 64! (1897); C/. Yates v. Nl-
waukee, io Wall. 497 (U. S. 1870).
' Ordinances for condemnation of defective structures have repeatedly been held constitutional, e.g.,
York v. Hargadine, 142 Minn. 219, 171 N. W. 773 (ziqi).
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remedy insanitary and substandard facilities.4 Personal liability of municipal em-
ployees for damages is still good common law, although some states, by statute,
grant immunity where the employee proceeded under a reasonable belief as to the
existence of the facts,' specifically outlaw private actions regardless of reasonableness,'
or simply transfer the liability in damages to the city.7
As the administrative process of compulsory repair of substandard dwellings and
the demolition of hazardous ones develops, there are indications that the judicial
process may accord correspondingly greater finality to administrative decisions. The
basic judicial requirement is "a day in court."'  A slum dwelling does not re-
quire the summary action essential in the case of diseased cattle, which also may be
destroyed by the municipal officer in his exercise of local police power. As bad
housing is not a nuisance that requires. summary action, from every point of view
ample notice and hearing are desirable elements of the administrative process. Thus,
increasingly the determination of whether or not the demolition shall proceed should
become administrative rather than judicial? Whether a building is a nuisance at
common law should no longer govern."° Let the evidence be weighed not by the
courts, wvho are laymen in this matter, but by experts who can appraise the condition
of dwellings from the standpoint of fire prevention, structural safety, health and
sanitation, and even moral hazard, by standards of objective validity, and formulate
a general plan of repair and demolition in the light of total local housing need and
supply.
The story of the development of municipal efforts with respect to the demolition
of substandard dwellings presents a dramatic instance of the problems of readjust-
ment of real property law to evolving housing needs. The nuisance doctrine pro-
vided a framework within which progress can be made towards the stimulation of
more perfect administrative processes, resulting in increasing immunity from judicial
review implicit in such modern formulas as that the administrative order shall be
conclusive if supported by evidence.
The nuisance doctrine made a second contribution upon the emergence of the
welfare state, namely, the technique of zoning. We have noted that the common
law doctrine of nuisance for centuries acted as a haphazard control over, for ex-
ample, the juxtaposition of offensive industrial to residential uses. The concept was
capable of considerable extension; not only the smells and fumes of an establishment
may be offensive, but also its height, which cuts off necessary light and air. Even
unaesthetic appearance may be a "nuisance" to the area. At common law these and
'Survey by P.W.A. Research and Information Branch, reported by EBENsrmE, LAW OF PUBLIc Hous-
ING (1940) It.
5 Such a statute was involved in Valentine v. Englewood, 76 N. J. L. 509, 71 At. 344 (1908).
8 See Milwaukee. W'is., code, section on demolition orders.
t This is the New York law. See Bellows v. Raynor, 207 N. Y. 389, ro N. E. i81 (1913).
: See People v. Board of Health, 14o N. Y. 1, 35 N. E. 320 (1893).
'Horbach v. Butler, 135 Neb. 394, 281 N. W. 804 (938), and the principle of New Hampshire
Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray, xo5 F. (2d) 212 (C. C. A. 7 th, 1939) may be harbingers of a new trend.
'0 See Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U. S. 171 (19S), and Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U. S. 394
(x9x6).
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like extensions were little realized, but they were promised great scope when the
zoning ordinance came into vogue. Zoning was to represent a coordinated effort by
the local government to plan the height, density and setback of buildings and the
distribution of residential and business uses, to the permanent social and economic
benefit of the community. It first appeared in New York City in 1917, was quickly
taken up as a model by other cities and was upheld by the Supreme Court as a
legitimate exercise of the police power."1
It should have been apparent from the beginning, however, that the zoning tech-
nique had serious limitations in being only prospective in operation. Zoning was
introduced into built-up areas; and it was destined to have little or no effect on
existing buildings or uses, although some thought is now being given to the con-
stitutionality of provisions for the gradual elimination of non-conforming uses by a
system of amortization.' With the years, other limitations of the zoning device
have appeared, largely attributable to its administration. There have been local busi-
ness pressures; indiscriminating variances by administrative boards on appeal; over-
zoning for particular uses with resulting inflation of values; low standards; and spot
rather than comprehensive zoning.
The police power that is articulated in zoning ordinances to regulate the char-
acter of future neighborhoods likewise supports state laws -and ordinances prescribing
minimum standards of construction of residential and other buildings. These ordi-
nances, dating principally from the beginning of the twentieth century, regulate such
matters as room size, fireproofing, plumbing facilities, etc., and have played an im-
portant role in improving housing conditions from the standpoint of health and
safety. Attempts to impose such raised standards retroactively are supported by the
courts.'" Such are the economics of housing, however, that legislatures have repeat-
edly had to bow to pressure for moratoria 4 or for special subsidy' to bolster the
program.
In the matter of specific building codes, reputed to obstruct the use of modern
and often cheaper materials than those which they prescribe, it is undoubtedly true
that while building codes are periodically being rationalized, their specific nature
may make them unwieldly and inflexible, and also their formulation by local inter-
ests may make them excessively responsive to pressure from manufacturers and labor
unions. Uniform codes are promoted, but except for the West Coast and certain
other areas, have not been generally adopted. Some variation between geographic
regions will, of course, always be essential. In this connection, it may be noted that
in recognition of the critical situation created by backward codes, the courts per-
mitted the government's wartime housing program to proceed in disregard of local
codes.'
"
1 Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926).
12See Note, Amortization of Property Uses Not Conforming to Zoning Rega'eont (1942) 9 U. OF
Cm. L. RE-. 477.
" Adamec v. Post, 273 N. Y. 250, 7 N. E. (2d) 120 (1937).
"'See, e.g., N. Y. Laws 1944, c. 6o6; N. Y. Laws 1945, C. 338, §64.
15See N. Y. Laws 1946, C. 321; cf. N. Y. TAx Law §5-a.
26United States v. City of Chester, 144 F. (2d) 415 (C. C. A. 3d, 1944)
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A serious block to the progress of the programs both for the demolition of sub-
standard housing and for the retroactive enforcement of higher housing standards has
been the lact of decent alternative accommodations at low rents in which to house
the families who must be displaced by these programs. The reconditioning of ten-
ements into higher rental dwelling units causes such displacement no less than
closure or demolition. This entire "second stage" suffers from a basic fallacy in its
faith in the "filtering-down" process. In the era when the welfare state began to
emerge, in the nineteenth century through the close of World War I and even until
the depression years, it was comfortably assumed that the poor should live in second-
hand housing and 'that there would be enough decent second-hand housing to go
around. To reason why is fruitless; the fact is that the housing that gets filtered
down is substandard to an important degree. Any program which pfoceeds alone
to demolish the substandard housing or to correct substandard conditions (and
thereby raise rents), in solving one problem has created another. Our economy is
such, and the state of housing technology has been so imperfect, that probably more
than one third of American families have been unable, throughout the industrial
era, to pay the prices or rents of new housing, and there is never enough decent
second-hand housing available to take care of their needs.
The poor chronically suffer from a shortage of homes. When, as in the years
immediately on the heels of the first World War, the housing shortage became acute
for everybody because there had been a cessation of new building, and serious in-
flation in rents was threatened, it was not inconsistent with the prevailing concept
of the role of the state to enact emergency rent control laws, which we're upheld by
the Supreme Court as a legitimate exercise of the police power in response to emer-
gency conditions. "Housing," said Justice Holmes in his opinion, "is a necessary of
life,"11 thus sounding the bell for new and more constructive housing programs
then about to emerge.
THIRD STAGE-THE PUBLIC WELFARE: GovER mENT IN PARmusmp wrm
PRIVATE ENTERI&RISE
By the I92O'S there was a growing realization in many circles of the appalling
inadequacy of earlier approaches to the problem of urban slums, which was now
nearly a century old. The slums were still there; perhaps more so. In addition to
the chronic problem of the high cost of decent housing that made it inaccessible to
masses of the people, the cities were beginning to suffer seriously from "blight"--
decaying blocks not of old tenement areas, but of abandoned, ill-planned industrial
and residential land, usually at inflated value, that was an eyesore to the community.
The slums and blight were accompanied by an accelerated decentralization, and as
the population fled from the unattractive core of the cities to the outskirts, they not
only drained local budgets by the ensuing duplication of municipal services: sewers,
streets, schools, subways, for the new peripheral residential developments, but further-
"Block v. Hirsch. 256 U. S. 135, z56 (1921).
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more, escaped beyond city limits, resulting directly in declining revenues which sat
side by side with the mounting tax delinquencies from the bad areas in the center
of town.
In that setting the remedies which composed the parcel of approaches character-
izing the second stage were woefully inadequate-like trying to depose a king with
a slingshot. Indeed, even if the local administrations had employed the earlier legal
and legislative weapons with their greatest effectiveness, the job probably could not
have succeeded against such a relatively free economy as characterized the era before
the depression. The technique of zoning, for example, carries such implications of
destruction to vested land values that it is obliged to come to terms with the power
of the local landowners.
The approach of the third stage is drastic. It smacks of the socialism which in
some form has become common to all the industrialized powers. The mood is not
simply to pick out the individual bad dwellings, but to tear down the whole neigh-
borhood and make it over again. Don't fuss to enforce compliance with revised
standards; build new decent homes wholesale. Rather than anticipate a dislocation
of demand and supply or a disparity between economic rent and income which war-
rants rent control as an emergency measure, control rents from the beginning, from
the time that the house is built. This is an age of superblocks, which are them-
selves an affront to the tradition of small 50-foot lot holdings in America's cities.
It is an age of bottomless private capital of insurance and trust companies and sav-
ings banks ready to enter the housing field, particularly the business of rental housing
in the cities; thereby presenting a threat to the oldtime "speculative" builders who
cannot compete with either the governmental advantages or the economies of bulk
operation available to the large concerns.
In this era of group control rather than piecemeal operation, the government is
a partier, silent or active, of substantially all activity related to the provision of
housing. In the i93o's when the bottom fell out of the home mortgage market, the
government stepped in to take the rap; HOLC bought up three billion dollars worth
of mortgages. Home financing practice has been rationalized and revolutionized
as a result of federal legislation. Now everyone is drifting into tenancy and home
ownership is more of an illusion than ever. In every aspect of housing whether
industrial or rural, rental or home owned, private ownership and control become
relative. The government is ubiquitous, and where not the government, something
akin to it which is in effect private government, in the form of mammoth lending
institutions or housing companies.
From the days when the courts were the repository of the principal controls that
were exercised over housing-by rules relating to restraints on alienation, to nuisance,
covenants, quiet possession-the initiative has passed to the legislative branch. The
courts rationalize a continuity in this progress of urban civilization in upholding
the validity of such legislative programs as expressions of governmental power to
18 See CHAL.Es ABRAMS, REVOLUTION IN LAN (1939)-
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adjust to changing conceptions of need, through the flexible formula of "public pur-
pose." In terms of legal tools these new developments probably have their greatest
significance in the expansion of the power of eminent domain, and in the implica-
tions of the new program for the tax power.
Use of the Taxing Power
This period is characterized by a deliberate use of the taxing power to stimulate
housebuilding or improvements by grants of immunity from liability for taxes. The
experience in New York State is a case in point. After World War I, in a move to
overtake the housing shortage the legislature permitted county and city units to
grant certain tax exemptions on the value of all new residential buildings constructed
within a given period.10 In x926 New York indulged in limited tax exemption for
the so-called limited dividend housing projects authorized in that year, to be con-
structed by private companies regulated by law as to rents and profitsYo When the
federal government's public housing program of direct construction by the govern-
ment of housing for low-income families, made its advent in the i93o's, tax exemp-
tion by the localities was an integral part of the plan for low rents' 1. combined with
a provision for annual. subsidies by the federal government; and the formula was
with some amendment adopted by the State of New York in its public housing pro-
gram launched under the new State Constitution in 1938.22 Subsequently, the prin-
ciple of "urban redevelopment" (to be discussed presently) began to be incorporated
in the state program, and by laws passed in 1941 and in 1942 as amended in i943,
the state authorized the grant of tax exemption in varying forms to induce private
capital to venture into slum clearance and rehousing operations.2 3 Fiially, as part
of the program for meeting the World War II housing shortage, a formula of tax
exemption and abatement has been authorized by the legislature to stimulate for
residential use the rehabilitation of now vacant and boarded-up tenements.'
With the validity of these various tax devices established,2 5 the lawyer's role be-
comes one'principally of legislative draftsman. In that capacity he could well pause
to consider whether past use of the taxing power in connection with the housing
program has been indiscriminate. Government has progressed far since the days of
William III, when a revenue tax on windows was a discouragement to decent hous-
ing standards. But in its eagerness to exploit the technique of immunity from taxes
as an inducement to housing construction, has it appreciated fully the over-all impli-
cations for municipal finance, or the differing effects of tax exemption in the differ-
1
"N. Y. TAx LAw S5.
*ON. Y. Laws 1926, c. 823, 530, now N. Y. Puxauc HousiNo LAw, Art. IX.
lThe public housing authority makes a formal payment to the municipality "in lieu of taxes," how-
ever, in amounts up to so per cent of the shelter rents on such aided projects.
"N. Y. PtuLIc HousiNG LAw, §52.
"N. Y. Laws 1941, C. 892; Laws 19.42, C. 845; Laws 1943, c. 234.
"N. Y. Laws 1946, C. 321.
" E.g., Hermitage Co. v. Goldfogle, 236 N. Y. 554, 142 N. E. 28! (x923), afl'g 204 App. Div. 7o,
199 N. Y. Supp. 382 (x923); Roche v. Sexton, 268 N. Y. 594, 198 N. E. 420 (935), aff'g 243 App.
Div. 687, 277 N. Y. Supp. 939 (1935).
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ing situations to which it is being applied? The general tax on real property,
representing the most substantial source of local revenue, .is already burdened by
increasing demands on the municipal budget, increasing tax delinquencies and con-
stitutional limits on the permissible tax rate. Moreover, real estate tax income fol-
lows people,26.and while tax exemption to public housing developments may involve
no out-of-pocket, bounty by the city, as the people there housed come largely from
tax-delinquent slum property, tax exemption (frequent though not invariable) to
private companies housing middle-income families represents a loss in the amount
of their taxpaying capacity, only partially offset to the extent that such people might
have followed thfe.suburban trend and moved out beyond the city limits altogether.
And when tax exemption is authorized together with liberal terms of tax abatement
to stimulate the rehabilitation of old tenements that could more profitably be torn
down and displaced by new housing, here may be the most wasteful kind of policy
decision. Tax exemption as a device continues to be promoted,' however. It is a
feature of the General Housing Bill (S. i592) which will probably be reintroduced
at the next Congress, providing for tax exemption not only for public housing, but
also as a municipal contribution to schemes of slum clearance and redevelopment.
A related development is the recent ruling by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
which allows income-tax concessions to builders of multi-family apartment houses 7
A different approach to the use of the taxing power for housing was proposed
in the last century by Henry George and his followers: site value taxation, which
would, it is argued, have the effect of correcting the chronic underbuilding of low-
cost housing. By removing the tax on improvements and imposing it on land so as
to tax increments in land value (more accurately termed "site" value), the cost of
land is bound to drop appreciably, thereby stimulating building activity2 8 The high
costs of city land have resulted in unreasonably high "densities," i.e., families per
acre, to make enterprise profitable; the densities and the high rental costs which
nevertheless result drive the population out to the periphery of the towns, creating
in turn the difficult problems of transportation, et al, alluded to above. Once build-
ing is adequately stimulated in town at lower cost, densities and land use are readily
amenable to control.
The optimum solution would be a municipal land authority with plenary powers
to determine a pattern of land use and to provide for the necessary regulation, tak-
ing account of population and industrial trends, recreational needs, and so forth2
It would seem to be the rational solution to the maze in which cities now find them-
selves. A similar proposal was advanced by a British parliamentary commission
headed by Lord Uthwatt a few years ago. The Uthwatt Report (giving substance
2'See Tugwel, The Red Ertate Dilemma (1942) 2 PUBLic ADMINIS'RAflO REV. 27.
'
7 Under this ruling, depreciation may be accelerated in the earlier years of the life of the building,
rather than charged off on an equal annual installment basis. N. Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1946.
"See Buttenheim, Unwise Taxation as a Burden on Housing (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 240.
29 See McDougal, Munidpal Land Policy and Control (1945) 242 ANNALS (of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science) 88, 93.
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to the ancient English principle that title to all land was ultimately in the Crown)
recommended that all land should ipso facto be declared in public ownership,
thereby converting existing ownerships into leasehold and facilitating public regu-
lation of land use.
Use of the Power of Eminent Domain
Second to no legal power in significance in this connection is the power of emi-
nent domain, whereby large areas are directly acquired for clearance, replanning
and rehousing. The necessity for employing the power of eminent domain in any
comprehensive attack on the slums is manifest, in view of the tangle of multiple
ownerships and hold-outs in sites to be acquired. And the government's venture
into the construction of houses, whether by its own agencies or by publicly regulated
companies, from the start has been linked with the program of slum clearance.
Thus, while the need for condemnation power might have been avoided were hous-
ing developments to be confined to vacant land on the periphery, it could not be
avoided if the provision of housing was to be part of a program of clearing away
the slums in the heart of the cities.
The government first ventured into large scale housing as part of the "make-
work" program of the Public Works Administration in the middle i93o's. The pro-
gram became permanent with the passage of the United States Housing Act in x937.
Under the formula developed by the federal legislators, for every public housing
unit to be provided by the localities with federal aid, there would have to be "equiv-
alent elimination" of a like number of substandard units. Public housing projects
are commonly constructed on former slum sites.
The second principal context for the use of the power of eminent domain in
connection with housing is illustrated by the Urban Redevelopment Corporations
Law passed in New York State in 1941. The gist of this legislation is a principle
of slum clearance by self-help, whereby lot owners take the initiative in pooling their
interests, covering an area of perhaps several city blocks, into a single corporation.
They take back stock proportionate to the value of their respective interests, and
the corporation undertakes clearance and rebuilding according to plan. Through
the i93o's there had ben serious consideration of the advantages of such a procedure
for the remaking of commercial no less than residential areas, but positive action
was balked by the problem of forcing into the scheme those owners who were not
willing to cooperate. Accordingly, under the 1941 law such redevelopment corpora-
tions were granted the benefits of the condemnation power and the recalcitrant
minority could thenceforth be silenced, upon receiving compensation in full for the
value of its property 0
80As we have noted earlier, this was not the first instance of governmental aid to private companies
for the provision of housing, as New York 'had in 1926 enacted a law whereby limited dividend housing
companies were granted limited tax exemption on certain conditions. The limited dividend companies
operating under the x926 law do not, however, enjoy any power of condemnation, exercisable either
directly or on their behalf.
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The third principal setting for the ex:ercise of the condemnation power is the
form of urban redevelopment more recent than the 1941 law and altogether more
popular. "Urban redevelopment" is still in its infancy, the first legislative provisions
dating only from 1942. It involves the clearance of urban land, usually fairly cen-
tral slum or blighted area, and its replanning and rebuilding for a variety of suitable
private and public 'uses. Logically, such redevelopment could incorporate wide use
of old structures, such as churches or decent residential properties or particular com-
mercial establishments; this has been widely done in England, but the limited ex-
perience under redevelopment laws in this country has so far not produced such
examples. A redevelopment here generally connotes the wiping clean of a large
city area, e.g., i8 city blocks on the lower East Side of Manhattan, and its replanning,
involving usually considerable rationalization of the street plan to accommodate
superblocks. The emerging pattern of the legislation is proposal of redevelopment
scheme by private company which enters into contract with the city and accepts a
certain amount of supervision and control of both fiscal and physical planning and
sometimes also of rents. The extent to which the power of condemnation is essen-
tial for these drastic clearance programs must be apparent.
The power of eminent domain can be exploited for housing also through excess
condemnation, whereby, by condemning more land than is needed for' the public
improvement which is the subject of particular condemnation proceedings, the city
comes into possession and ownership of lands thereupon available for the creation
of residential c6mmunities under public ownership or control.3 ' This is not a bold
approach, however. Town planners regard with envy the experience of many Euro-
pean cities, such as Stockholm and Copenhagen, where a large portion of the city
area is municipally owned; the European experience inspired a novel section in the
New York Constitution 'of 1938 (Art. x8, Sec. 9) to the effect that any city may
acquire "by purchase, gift, eminent domain or otherwise," such property as it may
deem "ultimately" necessary for its housing program, though temporarily not
required.
Proposals are made from time to time for the cities to take the initiative in buy-
ing up slum lands and replanning them, thereafter selling or letting to private
ownership, according to the scheme that has evolved. While the merit of such pro-
posals is clear to the city fathers, the stark matter of cost has been the usual obstacle
to action. Hence the trend towards redevelopment by insurance companies and
savings banks, which have a large reservoir of private capital and are both willing
to make the investment and in a position to do so. Their investment is not a com-
plete answer, however, as there remain central areas which because of excessive costs
cannot profitably attract clearance and necessarily involve an out-of-pocket loss upon
readjustment at proper use value. The formula in the Wagner-Ellender-Taft Bill,
" Where slum clearance is the subject of condemnation proceedings, excess condemnation is a device
for acquiring control over land adjacent to the development. See Note, The Constitutonality ol Excess
Condemnation (1946) 46 COL. L REv. xo8.
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which as S. 1592 passed the Senate at the last session of Congress and will be reintro-
duced, purports to provide the answer: federal aid to the municipalities by annual
contributions substantially making up the difference between the cost -of the land
and the new use value. This scheme has been satirically described as "the slum
dole,'32 and undoubtedly has the effect of bailing out landlords of slum property
to their profit.
Slum clearance and rehousing did not have to be approached by the costly slum
dole method, although now, there do not seem to be feasible alternatives. Under
English law, no condemnation award is given for buildings judicially determined
to be unfit for human habitation. In this country, constitutional guarantees of pay-
ment of full compensation preclude any such socially desirable solution. A more
wisely and widely developed use of the nuisance doctrine discussed earlier in this
paper, requiring demolition of unsafe and insanitary housing, would have accom-
plished the same result. This is still possible, although at the risk of an unfavorable
reaction of the courts upon subsequent condemnation, akin to the feeling of some
courts, in spite of formal doctrine, that the city is bound to condemn at some-
thing at least approximating the assessed value that it had itself placed on property
for purposes of taxation 3
Every extension of the power of condemnation requires judicial support of the
legislative finding that the land is to be acquired for a "public use." When this
question arose in connection with the federal government's public housing program,
the government lost in the lower courts, which were not inclined to interpret tra-
ditional authorities liberally so as to permit the government to go into the business
of housing3 4 Before taking the issue to the Supreme Court, decentralization of the
program for administrative considerations was decided upon and the legal question
became moot. Within a relatively few years, proponents of the program of public
housing had succeeded in establishing in state courts that housing qualified as a
public purpose! 5 Decisions contra are clearly an anachronism, such as the ruling of
the Ohio court a few years ago36
The legality of condemnation as an aid to redevelopment of the first kind de-
scribed above, a cooperative scheme of the present lot owners, has never been con-
tested in the courts, the war years having interrupted any plans that might have
materialized. The grant of the power of condemnation to redevelopment com-
panies, as that term is usually understood, has been ruled upon in both New York
and Illinois, and in both cases tht courts found the requisite "public use."3" A
" Abrams, The Slum Dole-A New Challenge to Public Housing (February, 1944) CHC Housing
News x.
" See ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAI (936) 515.
" United States v. Certain Lands in the City of Louisville, 78 F. (2d) 684 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935).
" N. Y. City Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N. Y. 333, x N. E. (2d) 153 (936) and other
decisions cited by McDougal and Muller, op. cit. infra note 36, at page 46.
" See MeDougal and Muller, Public Purpose in Public Housing: An Anachronism Reburied (1942)
52 YALE L. J. 42.
37Murray v. LaGuardia, 291 N. Y. 320, 52 N. E. (2d) 884 (1943); Zurn v. City of Chicago, 389
Ill. 114. 59 N. E. (2d) 18 (1945).
4 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
peculiar wrinkle of the New York case is that the very civic groups most interested
in promoting rehabilitation of slum areas by extensive use of governmental powers,
opposed the grant of condemnation under the Redevelopment Companies Law and
challenged the law's constitutionality. The New York State Constitution (Art. 18,
Sec. 2) authorizes the grant of the power of condemnation for slum clearance and
redevelopment either to a municipality or to a private company "regulated by law
as to rents, profits, dividends and disposition of its property or franchises." Under
the New York statute, it was argued, the condemnation power, although given nomi-
nally to the municipality, actually put the municipality in the position of an agent
for a company which could not have qualified as a regulated company within the
intendment of the constitutional provision. But the New York court would not look
behind the language of the statute and upheld it, on the principle that clearance of
sl ms alone constituted a sufficient public purpose. In this connection, it is of
interest that there is now a statute in New York which does no more than make
express the power of municipalities to acquire substandard and insanitary areas by
condemnation 8 s
The provision for the grant of the power of condemnation in the New York
Redevelopment Companies Law of 1943, which has been used as a model for other
jurisdictions, states that not only is the contemplated redevelopment in each case a
"public use," it is a "superior" public use. The implications of its being a superior
public use are serious for all public buildings, schools, fire houses, churches, and even
limited dividend housing projects on the site. The expression "superior public use"
must be galling to the thousands of families as well as business establishments that
are peremptorily displaced by redevelopments of the size of those now emerging.
Displaced families present an acute problem even when the nation is not suffer-
ing from a housing shortage, as for families living in slums there is a housing short-
age in the best of times. It would be ironic indeed if the effect of slum clearance
projects on a wide scale were simply to drive families into bordering tenements,
thereby depredating those properties and producing equally unsatisfactory slums
overnight. Legislative drafters have made some stabs at this problem, by requiring
that the city examine the provision that is to be made for displaced families, before
it gives its approval to any redevelopment scheme; and some laws (compare the
Wagner-Ellender-Taft Bill) legally obligate the redevelopment company to give
preference in its selection of tenants to families from the site area.
Redevelopment Projects and Minority Groups
The implications of large scale redevelopment are particularly keen for minority
groups living in the project areas. Negroes and other non-white persons are affected
by redevelopment projects in several ways: On the one hand, there are very few
UN. Y. Laws 1945, c. 887, adding Sec. 71-i to the MUNiciPAL LAw. The reader may be confused
as to the necessity for this statute, in view of Art, 18, Sec. 9 of the New York Constitution referred to
earlier; and indeed, many lawyers did not consider it necessary, but it was politically expedient at the
tine of passage.
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areas to which they are able to move, because of the prevalence of restrictions against
non-white occupancy. Moreover, as the pattern of housing for minorities in this
country is such that Negroes must generally live in cast-off housing rather than
new housing, it may be presumptively regarded as unlikely that they would be ad-
mitted to tenancy in the redevelopment project, unless there were some legal obliga-
tion to force their access39
Uppn analysis, it may appear to be a municipal rather than private responsibility
to determine the availability of housing for families displaced by such large scale
redevelopment schemes, as only the municipality can have the facilities for an ad-
equate study of the distribution of housing and of housing needs in the locality.
From the standpoint of social desirability, it would seem that redevelopment com-
panies, enjoying the status of "superior public use," and frequently the recipients of
tax exemption as well as other extensive public bounty, should be obligated to accept
tenants without discrimination as to race, creed or color and to give preference to
displaced families. As the result of a clamor over this issue in New York City's
first and largest redevelopment project, Stuyvesant Town, New York City now has
a I6cal law providing for the withdrawal of the benefits of tax exemption from any
housing or redevelopment company found to discriminate by reason of race, creed
or colorY° A like provision has been written into the state redevelopment law in
Pennsylvania."' An effort has been made42 and will be repeated to have such non-
discrimination policy enforced as a matter of constitutional law, on the theory that
as government is contractually and otherwise involved with private redevelopment
companies, it in effect participates in the discrimination, in violation of the guaran-
tees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Public housing has had a different history; the New- York State Law (the only
state public housing program in the country) specifically provides against discrim-
ination in tenant selection,43 and this is also federal practice, although not provided
for by statute. While non-discrimination by public housing authorities is general,
segregation within the project is still common, however.
In this era of large scale demolition and rebuilding with their special threat for
minority groups, the latter make persistent efforts to extend the non-discrimination
policy which governs public housing and is on the road to governing redevelopment.
nThis problem was well illustrated last spring, when the Planning Board of East Orange, New Jersey,
recommended a twenty-year redevelopment plan and the local Negro community noted with consternation
that it involved the proposed clearance of virtually ioo per cent of the areas occupied by Negroes. As
some of these areas included well-kept, owned homes, it was suspected that the replanning scheme might
have been motiYated by a desire to drive "undesirable" elements-out of East Orange, restoring it to its
place as a lily-white suburb for the professional white class. The New Jersey Redevelopment Companies
Law, modelled after the New York statute, impose.s no real obligation on redevelopment companies to
present a plan for the rehousing of displaced families, to give preference to displaced families in the
selection of tenants, or to accept tenants without discrimination as to race, color or creed.
0 Crrv oF NEw YoRK, AnamssraATE CODE SJ4 x-z.2.
"'PA. STAT. Amx. (Purdon, Supp. 1945) tit. 35, §171i(a)(i) and (8).
" Eliot Pratt, etc. v. LaGuardia ei d., 182 Misc. 462, 47 N. Y. S. (2d) 359 (1944) aff'd 268 App.
Div. 973, 52 N. Y. S. (2d) 569 (x944), Iv. to appeal denied, 294 N. Y. 842.
"1 N. Y, Pusmac HouING LAw 5223.
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Such efforts are made particularly when public aid or the grant of governmental
power is involved, as in connection with the bill to stimulate the rehabilitation of
tenements in New York by a liberal grant of tax exemption and abatement.44
Eventually, there will be a movement for the elimination of discrimination in
all private housing, just as some states have succeeded in enacting legislation, on the
FEPC model, to eliminate discrimination in private employment. In private hous-
ing accommodations, discriminations are generally rife.. Tens of millions of Amer-
icans who are members of minority groups suffer from a peculiarly limited market
in housing and are segregated in black belts or in ghettoes. It is easily demonstrable
that such persons have to pay much more for their housing than white families, and
also are obliged to pay such excessive prices for the most substandard homes." The
implications of this situation for our democracy, our economy, and our poltitical and
social development would fill volumes; only one of the many aspects of this difficult
problem was reflected in the circumstance that in the Detroit race riots of 1943 the
rioters came from segregated areas, not from mixed housing areas.
It is ironic that the federal government, which has made a notable contribution
towards breaking down discrimination in housing by its policy of non-discrimination
under the public housing program, has with another hand buttressed and encour-
aged the growth of restrictive housing practices. The Federal Housing Administra-
tion (the government's mortgage insurance agency) has for years been expressly
instructing its field men in the merits of restrictive covenants for the stabilization
of property values, and has discouraged the lending of money at easy credit for the
modernization and building of homes for non-white families. Some day the courts
will be presented with the challenge of evaluating the legality of such FHA practice
under our Federal Constitution and Congressional laws.40
The usual method for preventing Negroes and other unwanted elements from
acquiring or occupying property is by use of the covenant. As we have seen, the
covenant is one of the oldest legal tools available for the preservation of property
values against depreciating uses. Covenants could be of inestimable use today in
preserving physical standards of property replanned under comprehensive redevelop-
ment schemes; under the doctrine of Tulk v. Moxhay,47 covenants which a purchaser
takes with notice are enforced against him. The use of covenants, in schemes for
the general development of a residential area, to avoid ownership or occupancy by
persons of a particular race, creed or color has developed recently. A perversion of
the original purpose of this legal principle-yet, virtually every American jurisdiction
that has passed on its validity has upheld such a discriminating covenant (whether
written into the deeds upon the platting of a subdivision, or whether a separate
agreement hastily signed by contemporary property owners upon a threat of infil-
"See note 24 supra.
"See unpublished study by Corienne Robinson, "Condition of Dwellings by Rentals by Race," based
on 1940 Census (Federal Public Housing Authority Library).
"4Cl. R v. STAT. §1978 (1875), 8 U. S. C. (1940) 542.
" (1848) 2 Ph. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143.
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tration). Where such agreements also prohibit sale or lease to persons of particular
race, creed or color, they would seem to fall squarely within the prohibition of the
old English rule of the invalidity of restraints on alienation to whole groups of
people, and in deference to common law principles, many courts have struck down
covenants in this form, while at the same time upholding the validity of the cov-
enants against use.
In the dozens of law suits now pending for enforcement of such anti-racial cov-
enants in reliance on earlier decisions, important constitutional questions are being
raised, notably the matter of enforceability as an infraction of the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.48 Reference is
also made to the Chapultepec resolution and to the provision in the Charter of the
United Nations obligating the United States government to prevent within its bor-
ders discrimination on grounds of race, color or creed.
Covenants by land owners to keep out racial and other groups would seem to
constitute a conspiracy that should be denied enforcement at common law, housing
being "a necessary of life" and a subject of trade. A conspiracy against minority
groups in their strivings for decent housing is currently one of the subjects of an
anti-trust proceeding instituted this year by the Department of Justice against 37
banking and insurance companies of New York.50
In this setting of restrictive practices cutting down their market for housing, the
housing shortage is not new to the minority groups. They have always suffered
from a shortage and all its evils, and the present acute housing shortage which is
being suffered on an unprecedented scale by all Americans intensi.fies their plight
and accelerates the need for an early legal and practical solution: a challenge to the
statesmanship of the judiciary.
I In time of housing shortage, even the attempt to remove deficient housing and
to build new houses is frustrated by the lack of accommodations for the families to
be displaced, thus postponing what cannot afford to be postponed any more than
the construction of homes for veterans: the demolition of unsafe and insanitary
housing. And in time of housing shortage, a certain amount of jerry building is
inevitable; a certain amount of waste in the provision of facilities for projected new
subdivisions, is inevitable. In this speculative boom the necessity for sensible plan-
" See McGovney, Racial Residential Segregation by State Court Enforcement of Restrictive Agree-
ments, Covenants or Conditions in Deeds Is Unconstitutional (1945) 33 CALIF. L. Rav. 5.
'" See, for example, Anderson v. Auseth et al., pending before California Suprerrie Court (docket
no. L.A. no. 19759), and Kemp and Lutz v. Rubin, pending before New York Suprem6 Court, Queens
Country; cf. re Drummond Wren [945] O.W.N. 795 (Ontario).
" Figures produced as a result of the 1940 census which would seem directly to support the anti-
trust suit are findings that the non-white population pays on the average a higher interest return on first
mortgages than the white group. See op. cit. supra note 45. Special discrimination in the cost of credit
is particularly curious in view of the findings of the National Association of Real Estate Boards that Negro
families constitute at least as good a risk as mortgagors as white families, and maintain their proper,
well.
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ning gets lost, and much is constructed in a hurry that can then be repented at
leisure.
The limitations of this paper have naturally made impossible any thorough anal-
ysis of the legal issues which agitate the problem of veterans' housing today. This
has been only an outline of the trends, pointing up some of the provocative questions.
Attorneys close to the housing scene find interest centered particularly ih building
codes; federal legislation to bring down the prices and rentals of homes through
liberal public aid; restrictive covenants and problems incident to interracial occu-
pancy; planning and zoning controls over new subdivisions, already mushrooming
on the periphery of cities; the revival of cooperative housing and other mutual home
ownership plans. The difficulties which the housing and planning problem present
will be minimized by an appreciation on the part of lawyers and other social scien-
tists of the trends which are involved, and of their role in perfecting the necessary
legal tools and otherwise devising legal and practical solutions for apparent dilemmas.
